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Reference

Security policy

How to report a vulnerability, and how releases are protected

Reporting a vulnerability

Please don't open a public issue. Use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting: Security → Report a vulnerability on this repository. We aim to acknowledge reports within 3 working days and to agree on a disclosure date with you.

In scope: the desktop and mobile apps, the Rust core, the update and model download paths, LAN sync, and the release pipeline. Especially interesting: any way user content (audio, transcripts, notes, voiceprints) could leave the device without an explicit opt-in.

Network policy

Ghira is offline-first; PRIVACY.md defines exactly what may leave the device. In code:

Supported versions

Before v1.0, only the latest release gets security fixes.

Release integrity

Key storage on macOS

The store's master key is a non-synchronizable item in the login keychain (com.nhtera.ghira / store) in the alpha. The keychain asks before another app reads it, and a backup of the data folder alone can't open the store. Moving the item to the data-protection keychain (WhenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly, needed for app lock) requires a provisioning profile with the Developer ID, so it is decided with the first signed build.

Updater key

The in-app updater only installs updates whose manifest is signed with the project's Ed25519 updater key (minisign format). The public key is compiled into the app (crates/ghi-update).

What the app checks before installing: the manifest's signature; its sequence is not lower than one already seen (no replay of an old, pre-withdrawal manifest); it has not expired; the archive's size and SHA-256 match the manifest; the unpacked app is validly signed by the same Apple Team ID as the installed one. Only a strictly newer version is ever installed, and only when the user clicks "Restart to update". tools/release/sign-manifest.sh writes and signs a manifest (offline).

Withdrawing a release (kill-switch). List the bad version in the manifest's pulled field: apps running it ask their users to update. There is no rollback and no automatic downgrade: a newer store schema can't be opened by older code. A bad release is fixed by publishing a higher version (re-tag the previous code under a new version if needed). min_supported marks versions too old to update in place (users reinstall from the download page).

Custody.

Planned rotation (e.g. yearly, or when a maintainer with access leaves):

  1. Generate the new key pair offline.
  2. Ship release N with both public keys trusted, signed with the old key.
  3. Once most users run N or later (check download stats of N), sign releases with the new key only, and ship N+1 that trusts only the new key.
  4. Destroy the old private key and record the rotation in the release notes.

If the key is lost or compromised:

  1. Take the update feed offline so no further manifests are served.
  2. Publish a security advisory with the fingerprint of the affected key.
  3. If the old key is still under our control, ship one last update signed with it that trusts only a new key. Otherwise, users must download and install the new build manually from the official site, and we say so clearly.

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